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Symbols, Impossible Numbers, and Geometric Entanglements: British Algebra Through the
Commentaries on Newton’s Universal Arithmetick
By Helena Mary Pycior. Cambridge, UK (Cambridge Univ. Press). 1997. ISBN 0-521-48124-4. 328 pp.
The author of this book is well known for her studies on the history of British algebra. In her Ph.D. thesis
of 1976, she already tackled the long-term history of the negative numbers in the context of her analysis
of 19th-century British algebra, and W.R. Hamilton’s role in particular. In a series of later papers, she
explored the philosophical contexts of 17th- and 18th-century conceptual and methodological develop-
ments in Britain. With the present book, she aims to give a comprehensive view of the mathematical
and philosophical debates and their interactions from about 1630 to 1750, characterizing the evolution of
algebra in Britain.
The book is divided into 10 chapters. While the first gives a survey of the international development of
algebra during the 16th and the first half of the 17th century, featuring in particular the work of Cardano,
Bombelli, and Viète, each of the other nine chapters investigates the work of one or two key figures in
Britain, progressing in chronological order.
Thus, the second chapter analyzes how William Oughtred and Thomas Harriot first introduced “con-
tinental” algebra, in particular Viète’s work, to the British Isles. Given their adaption of Viète’s algebraic
sign style, the two are presented as the first proponents of symbolical reasoning in Britain. The use of
these terms suggests essential continuity up to the 19th century’s famous stage of symbolical algebra
(p. 9). Besides analyzing these authors’ algebra textbooks, both published in 1731, some of Harriot’s
manuscript sheets are discussed, showing how he “privately experimented with deviationary versions of
the rule of signs for multiplication” (p. 60).
In these first two chapters, it becomes clear that the author applies Nesselmann’s standard model of
a three-stage development of algebra: from a rhetorical style to a symbolical one, and eventually to its
abstract stage. While Cardano “wrote and reasoned in prose, not in symbolism” (p. 13), Viète is credited
with having been the first to introduce the use of symbols.
The third chapter is devoted to John Collins (1625–1683), who was not a productive mathemati-
cian himself but who was strongly involved in ensuring communication among British mathematicians
and in informing them about news from the continent. The stated objective of this chapter is to show
Collins’s activities in pushing the preparation of an English algebra textbook—given the insufficiency
of Oughtred’s and Harriot’s books—while already expressing some “patriotic” concerns. The actual in-
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tention, however, is to contextualize the fact that Oughtred and Harriot had not yet achieved a proper
British takeoff in algebra, so that further input from the continent was needed. In fact, the main content
of the chapter is to inform the reader about relevant developments then new on the continent, in particular
about Descartes’ work and its reception in Britain. Wallis’ nationalistic campaign to accuse foreigners of
plagiarism is briefly mentioned.
The next chapter analyzes two new algebra textbooks, of 1668 and 1673/1674, respectively, neither of
which satisfied Collins’s demand for a truly British textbook. The first of these was in fact a translation by
John Pell (who added notes) of a Swiss textbook in German by Johann H. Rahn, bearing the telling title
“Teutsche Algebra.” The second British textbook, by John Kersey, a surveyor, was criticized by Collins
for not sufficiently introducing the reader to all of continental algebra, and in particular for being too
sparse in the theory of higher equations.
Both books are credited with having brought to Britain the notion of negative numbers as being “less
than nothing” (p. 88). While a quotation from Kersey’s book shows that he used the notion of opposite
quantities (p. 93), this is not commented upon by the author.
Chapter five is devoted to John Wallis, the first representative of a genuine “early modern” English
algebra, founding algebra on arithmetic and proclaiming algebra’s independence from geometry, devel-
oping it in particular toward operating with negative and imaginary quantities. Wallis’s plea for “pure
algebra” shows his “disentanglement” of algebra from geometric underpinnings. Wallis’s enthusiasm
provoked two Britishers to respond: the philosopher Thomas Hobbes and the mathematician Isaac Bar-
row. Both strongly objected to granting algebra the status of a science, arguing most fervently against
according algebra supremacy over geometry, and advocating instead the superiority of geometry and of
the synthetic method. Claiming a dependence of arithmetic on geometry, they rejected numbers having
no physical reference. In contrast to the situation in the second half of the 18th century, the “synthetic
backlash” (p. 135) remained restricted to epistemology. Remarkably enough, as one understands from
Pycior’s description, neither thinker objected to legitimizing negative quantities or to operating with
them (pp. 143, 160).
It is the author’s merit to provide an extensive and in-depth analysis of Newton’s work and publications
in algebra, notably of his “lectures on Algebra,” published in 1707 in Latin and later in English as Uni-
versal Arithmetick, a book which became highly influential even on the continent. After characterizing
Newton’s approach as “mathematical pragmaticism,” i.e., as not bothering too much with foundations,
Pycior shows Newton to have provided an exposition of the practice of algebra of unprecedented gener-
ality and extent, one which included the new types of quantities. Yet she affirms a “mixed” legacy, since
Newton showed a growing concern for a geometric entanglement of algebra, as evidenced by an increas-
ingly conservative view of imaginary roots (p. 197) and a growing appreciation of classical geometry in
his later years (p. 204).
In chapter eight, Berkeley is shown to have achieved noteworthy merit in establishing philosophical
foundations for abstract algebra as “science of signs.” Basing his views on the work of Wallis, Hobbes,
and Newton, Berkeley developed a more consistent foundation for negative and imaginary numbers than
Wallis, who had to rely on geometric interpretations (p. 230). Chapter nine discusses two contrasting
receptions in another British context, Scotland. Robert Simson, mathematics professor at Glasgow uni-
versity and ardent propagator of classical geometry as the model for mathematics, was the first not only
to criticize analytic geometry, but also to reject negative numbers (p. 247). His counterpart was Colin
MacLaurin, professor at Edinburgh, who in his Treatise of Fluxions and in his Treatise of Algebra devel-
oped Newton’s Universal Arithmetick further.
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The last chapter analyzes Nicholas Saunderson’s contributions to algebra in England, also based on
Newton’s approach, but arguing more convincingly for the supremacy of the analytical method. Pycior
shows Saunderson’s merits even on the technical side, trying “to make of algebra a demonstrative sci-
ence” (p. 295). The book ends in the 1740s, when an algebraic tradition seemed to have been established
at Cambridge University, before the seed of renewing classical geometric, synthetic approaches spread
from Scotland to other parts of Britain.
The book is exceedingly well written, based on a profound knowledge of the British mathematical
community of the time, its debates and concerns. The study has the advantage of explicitly considering
and presenting the contexts in which the various contributors to mathematics were working. In analyzing
their contributions to algebra, Pycior emphasizes more the epistemological and terminological aspects
of the field and insists less on how these writers applied their foundational convictions or on how they
operated algebraically. It is one of her concerns to show historical doubts about whether to designate
imaginary roots as “imaginary” or as “impossible” ones, for instance in Newton (p. 195 sqq.)—implying
that “impossible” denies them mathematical status (although the term “imaginary” was created to denote
a mathematically not legitimate expression).
On the other hand, she fails to observe that Newton is the first to give just one, normal form for each
degree of an equation—for instance xx − px − q = 0 for the second degree—so that coefficients here
are understood in a really general manner. Newton’s method of carrying out algebraic operations hence
reveals important epistemological achievements.
Given her concern for terminology, it seems out of place for her to make a rather equivocal use of a
key term: she uses “negative quantities” and “negative numbers” almost synonymously. Very often, she
just speaks of “the negatives,” an expression apparently intended as a common denominator for the two
notions. Even when giving a quotation where an author is speaking of “negative quantities” she tends to
rephrase his argument as one dealing with “negative numbers.” In Wallis, for instance, she paraphrases
from his letter to Collins of May 1673: “he had been ‘of opinion from the first,’ that algebraists should
use both negative and imaginary numbers” (p. 107). Actually his opinion had been on quantities: “that
a negative plane may as well be admitted in algebra as a negative length, both being in nature equally
impossible” [Rigaud, 1841, p. 577].
In fact, the differentiation between quantities and numbers presents the essential historical step toward
clarifying the nature of “the negatives.” A failure to distinguish between the respective conceptions in the
sources raises a serious methodological problem.
This problem is frequent in studies intending to assess long-term developments of mathematical con-
cepts: to evaluate a work, one needs a “standard” by which one can “measure” the contribution of a given
historical author as to its relative merit. But how to establish and to define such a “standard” for the
conceptual development in question? Much too often, the concept used as a measuring staff is the result
of the development, the accepted modern version of the very concept which is to be evaluated. Pycior
has chosen an approach which seems to avoid the methodological pitfalls of measuring by the result: she
alludes to “the expanding universe of algebra,” a figure of speech which by implying a process might
appear to get around the problems associated with the result-oriented perspective.
Actually, however, the methodological problems raised by her approach are not smaller. The author’s
“expanding universe” is rather more a conjuring formula for an abstract process. In mathematics, how-
ever, expansion—if there is one—is effected by concrete actors: there is no automatic process, and neither
is there a permanent movement which continues by virtue of its own inertia. Many of the actors presented
by the author were—at least partially—opposed to precisely that expansion. For example, while Cardano
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is attributed to have initiated “expanding the universe of objects accepted as legitimate algebraic en-
tities” (p. 17), the author claims that he “championed the expanding universe only with reservations”
(p. 24). And further: “Western algebraists (after Cardano) did not immediately or, over the next century,
unequivocally embrace the expanding algebraic universe” (p. 24). Oughtred and Harriot, the two English
pioneers, have to be described as perpetuating Viète’s “hesitancy about the expanding algebraic universe”
(p. 40), as they all rejected negative quantities. How can the universe be expanded when the driving forces
were hesitant to do so, to say the least? Again, Wallis is ranked among those with “no full commitment to
the expanding universe of algebra” (p. 56), since “the negative and imaginary numbers were anomalies
in Wallis’s theory” (p. 230).
The “expanding universe” is an alleged process of abstract character which occurs outside the human
actors or without their doing, since it already implies using processes’ outcomes as the measurement
standard. It is all the more abstract as the second methodological problem it raises is to imply linearity
in historical development. At the very beginning of the work, the author is herself puzzled by the “many
different twists on algebra” uncovered and concludes: “British algebra did not develop in a fundamentally
linear version” (p. 3). Pycior’s own vision of conceptual development seems to be a rather continuist one,
so that she hastens to affirm, “This is not to say that there was no linear development,” without explaining,
however, these two conflicting assertions. Including the study of the second half of the 18th century in the
book as well would have facilitated not only exploring the nonlinear character of some of the foundational
debates, but also examining the differentiation between “quantity” and “number” as a means to clarify
the nature of negative and imaginary numbers.
A further intruiging dimension of the study is that it assumes a national specificity of conceptual
developments in mathematics. The author attributes to the group of mathematicians studied that they were
“sharing a national identity” (p. 3)—an identity which went so far as to take, for example for Wallis, the
form of a “national chauvinism” (p. 128). It would have been very rewarding if the author had reflected
more explicitly on this dimension of national specificity, say, by comparing it to other national cases.
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A distinguished logician and proof theorist gathers together here 13 of his more general articles published
over two decades. Some corrections and updating have been effected; one article has been split in two.
